The Constitutional Right before the New World Postpandemia. A New Opportunity for the European Constitutional Paradigue: The Need to Regular Glass Steagall Regulation in the Eu, as Ineludible for Strategical Authonomy

The massive expansion of COVID-19 has ended up collapsing the overall health systems, mostly unprepared and unprotected, which oblige all coun-tries to implement drastic measures of prolonged isolation, with terrible global consequences for employment, income and expenditure, whose hori-zon is still uncertain in virtually all parts of the world. The pandemic has caused the breakdown of productive chains that sustain not only world trade but the international division of labour once the damage to supply channels has ended up affecting 30 per cent of global manufactures. In this context of destruction China far from recession has recovered all pre-pandemic GDP, while Europe and the US are suffering from historic recessions that force the supply chains to review, especially over six strategic sectors: defence, public health, biotechnology, communications technology, energy, transport and food production. It is time for Europe to come up with constitutional regulation to imitate what Glass Steagall meant in the US as the top expo-nent of banking regulation banning commercial banking and investment banking could act together through a capture of predatory rents;all this financial prudence of US governments jumped in 1999 when Alan Green-span as president of the American Federal Reserve and Bill Clinton, as Pres-ident of the United States repealed the Glass Steagall Law and authorized the merger of two giants, Citicorp and Travelers, born from the Citigroup merger that would have been banned with Glass Steagal, a new Graham-Leach Billey Act, which allowed the unification of commercial banking ac-tivities with the activities of the investment banking. This led to the 2008 crisis that almost resulted in the destruction of the euro by European de-pendence on US and Chinese investment banking. As a result of this eco-nomic turmoil, which is still very present in Europe, has become aggravated by the pandemic, so constitutionalists can continue to ignore the macroeco-nomic reality in their analyses hidden behind positivism or, on the contrary, have at least the daring to interpret macroeconomists from our discipline, which should provide its methodological approach since market understand-ing cannot be limited to mere mathematical algorithms that the previous cri-sis already called into question, since the methodology of rational expecta-tions with macroeconomic optimization through dynamic Stochastic models of General Equilibrium were positioned years light of the real economy..

How Covid-19 Hit Brussels and Beyond: The EU’s Crisis Management Tested by a Pandemic

The EU is certainly not unfamiliar with crisis management, at least not in the broad sense of the term. Its history is marked by crises and the last ten years were even labelled a polycrisis. This seemed to end after the 2019 European Parliament elections with a new Commission that wanted to prepare the EU for geopolitical policy-making that went beyond crisis management. However, the Covid-19 pandemic caused one of the biggest crises to ever hit the Union. After initial hesitation and criticism, the EU’s institutions showed remarkably strong resilience, combining short-term crisis management with mid-term policy-making and long-term innovative solutions for a number of long-standing political hot topics. This chapter analyses the EU’s response by looking at its institutions and discussing how they behaved—vis-à-vis the Member States and on the world stage—as primary actors of its Covid-19 crisis management. © 2023, The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG.

Coronavirus Test of the European Union’s Policy on the Rule of Law

The issue of the rule of law has been on the European Union’s (EU) agenda since the beginning of the 2010s. The legal history of the EU shows that the EU’s approach to the topic of the rule of law underwent significant changes. Initially, the Member States called for guarantees of fundamental rights in EU institutions. This trend began to change in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when the possibility of European rule of law control over Member States and the predecessor of the current Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) were introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam. However, the idea that the EU institutions can constantly monitor the Member States in the name of the rule of law has only emerged and started dominating the European political agenda since the early 2010s. Over the last decade, the EU institutions have continuously expanded their toolkit for monitoring Member States in this regard.ollowing calls from some Member States and the European Parliament, in 2014 the Commission set up the new EU framework to strengthen the rule of law. In the same year, the European Council introduced an annual rule of law dialogue. In 2016, the European Parliament proposed the establishment of an annual rule of law report that monitors all Member States. At first, the European Commission was reluctant to accept this idea, but finally it introduced an annual rule of law report in 2020. However, the EU’s policy on the rule of law suffers from fundamental shortcomings, which were especially visible during the first wave of the coronavirus crisis in the spring of 2020. In the pandemic situation, it has become even more apparent that the EU’s policy on the rule of law raises a significant issue of EU institutions exceeding their competences and stands on a questionable legal basis.riticisms formulated against Hungary during the pandemic have revealed that the EU institutions do not provide sufficient guarantees for an objective examination of the situation of the rule of law in the Member States. The situation brought about by the coronavirus has also raised a number of questions regarding the lawful functioning of EU institutions, which shows the need for a rule of law mechanism capable of verifying that the EU institutions themselves also properly respect the rule of law.

CE QUE LA THÉORIE DES CHAMPS NOUS DIT DE L'ADMINISTRATION EUROPÉENNE (II) : LES TRANSFORMATIONS DU CHAMP BUREAUCRATIQUE EUROPÉEN (2000-2020) LES TRANSFORMATIONS DU CHAMP BUREAUCRATIQUE EUROPÉEN (2000-2020)

What field theory tells us about the European administration (II): The transformations of the European bureaucratic field (2000-2020) - This paper is the second part of the analysis of the European bureaucratic field developed above in this special issue. In the first part, we sought to better explain the concept of the bureaucratic field on a theoretical level as well as the new perspectives it opens up for studying the European institutions. Beyond its immediate contribution to shedding light on the profile of key institutional actors, the sociology of the field of eurocracy treats the European institutions as a space of human as well as institutional relations. In doing so, it highlights a set of sociological structures that act as a condition for the very concrete practices and relations of cooperation and authority within the administrative-political compromise-making machine that are the institutions and the broader "milieu" they represent. We have also provided some methodological clarifications and limitations that are useful for making this analytical grid work in conjunction with others. In this second part, we will not develop the consequences for the analysis of singular European public policies whose space is to be constructed on a case-by-case basis (on these aspects, see Ponte et al., 2017;Bigo, 2018;Roger, 2020;Georgakakis, 2022). We will focus on what this reading grid tells us about the medium-term and more recent transformations of the European administrative field in its generic form and especially from its Brussels centre. © 2022 Ecole Nationale d'Administration. All rights reserved.